War with India, and an American embargo

Background

Relations were strained before the fighting began. Pakistan's growing ties with China troubled Washington, and in April 1965 President Johnson postponed a planned visit by Ayub Khan; Secretary of State Rusk told the embassy there was no give in the decision and that, given the mood in Congress, a visit could jeopardise aid. In July the meeting of the aid consortium for Pakistan's development plan was also postponed. Ayub concluded that the two postponements were part of a pattern of American indifference to Pakistan's essential interests^1,2.

The war

Skirmishes in the Rann of Kutch in the spring of 1965 were followed in August by Operation Gibraltar, in which Pakistani-trained irregulars infiltrated Indian-administered Kashmir in the hope of sparking an uprising; it failed to win local support³. Fighting escalated, and on 6 September Indian forces crossed the international border towards Lahore and Sialkot. Pakistan commemorates that day as Defence Day; India regards its offensive as a response to Pakistan's operations in Kashmir, including Operation Grand Slam towards Jammu⁴. The Office of the Historian describes the war as the second between the two countries over Jammu and Kashmir⁵.

The American response

On 8 September the United States suspended military assistance shipments to both India and Pakistan, and informed both governments. The decision was announced in the House of Representatives by the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, George Mahon, setting out positions given to him by Rusk; the administration said it was acting in support of the efforts of the UN Security Council and Secretary-General to end the fighting, and also held back new economic commitments^6,7. Washington supported the Security Council's ceasefire resolutions, and a ceasefire took effect on 23 September⁵.

Why it mattered

The embargo was even-handed in form but not in effect. Pakistan's armed forces had been built almost entirely with American equipment, while India relied far more on British, French and Soviet supplies and its own industry; spare parts, ammunition and replacements for Pakistan dried up⁸. Pakistanis at many levels felt that their ally had abandoned them in their hour of need, and that the 1959 agreement had proved hollow. American officials pointed out that US arms had been provided for defence against communist aggression, not for war with India, and that Washington had warned both countries against such use⁹.

The perceived betrayal pushed Pakistan further towards China, which had given it diplomatic support during the war, and towards a more balanced foreign policy, symbolised by Ayub's memoir title Friends Not Masters (1967)^8,10.

Legacy

The 1965 embargo became a lasting grievance in Pakistani memory, invoked whenever American reliability is debated, and the first of a series of US arms cut-offs that would shape Pakistani strategic thinking for decades^9,10.