A decade of sanctions is lifted in five weeks

Background

By 2001 Pakistan was one of the most heavily sanctioned US partners in the world. Pressler amendment restrictions had cut off most aid since 1990; the Glenn amendment had been triggered by the nuclear tests of May 1998; the Symington amendment, originally imposed in 1979 over Pakistan's enrichment programme, remained on the books; section 508 of the foreign appropriations act barred aid to governments that had come to power by military coup, as Musharraf's had in October 1999; and Pakistan's arrears on US loans brought further limits^1,3.

What happened

On 22 September 2001, eleven days after the attacks, President George W. Bush used waiver authority that Congress had granted in 1999 to lift the Glenn amendment sanctions on both India and Pakistan, and waived the Symington amendment for Pakistan^1,2. The Arms Control Association noted that the decision on Pakistan came in large part because of the cooperation Washington had received from Islamabad since 11 September; India, which was also cooperating, benefited from the same move¹.

Congress moved next. Senator Sam Brownback introduced S. 1465 on 25 September; it was reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 4 October and signed into law on 27 October 2001 as Public Law 107-57. The act authorised the president to waive, through the 2002 and 2003 fiscal years, the coup-related ban on assistance, some missile-technology and export-control sanctions imposed on Pakistani entities before 2001, and the restrictions arising from loan defaults, provided he judged that doing so would help the fight against terrorism and serve US national security^3,4.

Why it mattered

Together the two steps cleared the legal path for the large economic and security assistance programmes of the following decade, for debt rescheduling and for renewed military sales. For Pakistanis the speed of the reversal was striking: measures that had been justified on non-proliferation and democratic grounds disappeared once Pakistan became strategically useful, which reinforced a view, already widespread, that US policy towards Pakistan was driven by short-term need³.

Legacy

The coup-related waiver had to be renewed year by year until the elected government took office in 2008. The episode is often cited in both countries as an example of the transactional pattern in the relationship: periods of sanctions followed by sudden waivers when Washington needs Pakistan's help.